ICE’s Arrest of Mahmoud Kahlil is Deeply Troubling

05 March 2025

Chris Hammond

The recent ICE arrest and detention of Mahmoud Kahlil, a lawful permanent resident (LPR), is profoundly concerning. ICE agents who arrested Kahlil at his home reportedly believed he was in the United States on a student visa (F-1). Later, a government spokeswoman issued a statement that Mr. Kahlil’s green card was being revoked, alleging his campus activism in support of Palestine was “aligned to Hamas.” Later, it was reported that Secretary of State Marco Rubio ordered Mr. Kahlil’s deportation under INA § 237(a)(4)(C). This rarely used provision allows deportation if the government reasonably believes a non-citizen’s presence “would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences.”

INA § 237(a)(4)(C) gives the federal government broad power, historically granted wide latitude by courts, particularly under the plenary power doctrine. Yet applying this statute to campus speech and political activism—without evidence of violent or material support to terrorism—raises profound constitutional concerns under both the First and Fifth Amendments.

Lawful permanent residents like Mr. Kahlil are protected under the First Amendment. While immigration law grants wide discretion to the government, using political speech alone as grounds for deportation represents a disturbing turn by this administration towards authoritarianism. Historical precedents highlight that courts, though typically deferential to immigration authorities, have become wary of actions seen purely as retaliation for political expression. For instance, in the 2018 case of Ragbir v. Homan, the Second Circuit recognized that using immigration enforcement as retaliation against protected speech can be “outrageous” enough to violate the First Amendment. Mr. Kahlil’s removal has already been temporarily suspended by a federal district judge; immigration advocates will be watching this case closely to see what federal courts and perhaps eventually the U.S. Supreme Court decide about the constitutionality of Mr. Kahlil’s arrest and potential deportation.

The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause further complicates the government’s case. Procedural fairness demands transparency and a meaningful opportunity to respond to the government’s accusations. If, as often occurs in national security-related immigration cases, secret or classified evidence is presented against Kahlil, courts have previously found such practices violate due process rights—particularly if the evidence is critical to the government’s case. The district court ruling in Kiareldeen v. Reno notably criticized and rejected reliance on secret evidence as fundamentally unfair.

Importantly, INA § 237(a)(4)(C) itself requires only that the government have “reasonable grounds” to believe a serious foreign policy harm might occur. But how far can “potential harm” extend? If mere political protest advocating for Palestinian rights can trigger deportation because it angers an ally, what are the limits? Such enforcement creates a troubling precedent where political expression—rather than actual violence or direct support for terrorism—can threaten one’s very right to remain in the United States.

This case emerges amid increasing rhetoric from government officials openly advocating deportation as a tactic to target foreign pro-Palestinian activists. Such statements by top officials raise troubling questions about selective enforcement and equal protection violations, particularly when targeting appears politically motivated.

Kahlil’s case is not isolated. President Trump tweeted that politically targeted deportations would continue. It parallels broader government actions increasingly targeting immigrants based on their political beliefs, associations, or even social media posts. As previously discussed in our recent post analyzing government scrutiny of immigrant social media use, these trends reflect growing concerns around immigrant speech rights and due process in an era where political expression is increasingly policed through immigration mechanisms.

Immigration attorneys and advocates should watch this case closely. If the government succeeds here, it sets a precedent likely to chill political expression among immigrant communities nationwide, silencing critical voices and potentially undermining core constitutional protections. Conversely, vigorous defense and judicial review in Kahlil’s case could reinforce constitutional protections for all U.S. residents—citizen or not—clarifying that political speech, no matter how controversial, cannot alone be the basis for removal.